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Summarv
Contemporary public policy toward consumer product safety relies increasingly
on industry developed safety standards. These standards prescribe requirements
which effectively set minimum levels for consumer product safety and are developed
directly by industry or indirectly in conjunction with one of several independent
technical organizations. This essay analyzes the economic circumstances under
which producers will, in their self-interest, seek to develop standards, and the
direction of bias (if any) between optimal safety levels and the minimum levels
set by producers. Standard development by both price competitive and collusive
firms are considered, with the most probable outcome being that the minimum safety
level will be set too high.
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An increasingly common response to consumer concern over product
safety is promulgation of industry developed safety standards. These
standards prescribe requirements which effectively set minimum levels
for consumer product safety, and are developed directly by industry
(through trade associations) or indirectly in conjunction with one of
several independent technical organizations (such as the American
National Standards Institute (ANSI) or Underwriter's Laboratories (UL)).
In theory, individual firms are often free to comply with or to ignore
these product guidelines, hence their common designation as "voluntary
standards." In actual practice however, there are usually substantial
pressures on firms for adoption and the term producer developed stan-
dards will thus be used for this essay.
The rationale for these standards is of course some sort of market
failure due to the inabilities of consumers to directly monitor safety
of complex products. Regardless of the merits of such rationales, basic
questions arise as to the economic circumstances under which producers
will in their self-interest seek to develop standards, and as to the
direction of bias (if any) between optimal safety levels and the minimum
levels set by producers. A naive approach to the latter issue is to re-
gard producers as uniformly seeking safety levels that are lower than
optimal. It is important to recognize that little support for this ap-
proach will be found in this essay. Indeed, the most probable outcome
when producers develop binding minimum standards is that the safety
level will be set too high.
The structure of this essay is as follows. First the theory of
determination of safety levels in competitive markets is outlined. Then
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the nature of producer intervention into these markets through establish-
ment of standards is specified. Next, the economic implications of this
intervention are considered under two different market structures: a) an
industry composed of symmetric, competitive firms, and b) an industry where
a dominant cartel establishes price and, now, minimum safety levels while
a second set of firms constitutes a competitive fringe. The arguments of
the second model are then illustrated by consideration of the architectural
glass standard of the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission. While this
standard is enforced by the U.S. federal government, it was developed by
industry representatives and thus provides an exact example of the argu-
ments in the text. Policy recommendations conclude the essay.
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II. Competitive Determination of Safety Levels
As background to examination of producer developed standards, it
is necessary to review the theory of determination of safety levels by
unrestricted competitive markets. After all it is avoidance of competi-
tive outcomes which provide motivations for firms to self-develop safety
standards. The development of the theory below draws heavily from Oi
(1973), Rosen (1974), and Spence (1978).
For a product which entails risk of accident during consumption,
consumer demand is a function of the perceived full price per unit, or
the sum of market price and a risk cost per unit. When consumers are
fully informed, this full price may be written as:
„ x * K(A(x)) , ,(1) p* p + p + ka
where p* = full price
p = market price
k = risk cost per expected accident
a = expected accidents per unit of product
x = units of product
K =• total risk cost (=kax)
A = accident level (=ax)
In a more appropriate nonlinear formulation, risk cost is an increasing
function of accident risk, with K.. > 0, and the expected accident level
is an increasing function of units consumed, with A < 0. The linear
formulation in equation (1) simplifies the analysis without altering
basic implications or the model. Given symmetry of consumers, the quan-
tity demanded of the risky commodity from (n) symmetric firms of the in-
dustry is given by
(2) D(nx) = P*
where the output of each individual firm is denoted by (x)
.
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A perfectly competitive firm will confront a fixed full price in
the market (Rosen (1974)). Profits for the firm are therefore:
(3) tt = (p* - ka)x - C(x,a)
where reasonable restrictions on the derivatives of the cost function
C(x,a) are:
C > C <
x a
C > C >
sx — aa
C <
xa
Profit maximizing levels of output and accident rate are respectively
given by:
W p - c
x
(5) -kx = C
a
Equation (4), denoted henceforth as the X-equation, provides the familiar
equivalence of price and marginal cost under market conditions of perfect
competition. The second condition, or the A-equation, provides for min-
imization of total social costs of the product, given a particular level
of output. The perfectly competitive market thus achieves a welfare
optimum. This optimum will not occur if firms act to cartilize output
or if consumers improperly perceive the accident rate.
ihe effects of monopoly power on product safety (or quality) have
been analyzed at length elsewhere (Levhari and Peles (1973), Kihlstrom
and Levhari (1977), Schmalensee (1979), and Swan (1971)).
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Figures One, Two, and Three graphically present the profit maxi-
mizing conditions for a competitive firm facing a given full price.
When the following discriminant is negative, Figure One is the correct
representation (for a more formal comparative static analysis, see the
Appendix)
:
(6) H = xC - Cv xa a
When the discriminant is positive Figure Two is correct, and when H is
zero Figure Three represents the appropriate diagram. The second order
conditions require that the X-curve and the A-curve have the relative
positions as shown. Despite the analytical centrality of the discriminant
in (6), there is no sensible restriction on the cost function to insure
unambiguous sign. For production processes where safety is improved
through manufacture of each unit, a cost function of
(7) C(x,a) = g(a)x6 <5 > 1
might be appropriate, and here the discriminant is negative. In con-
trast, for production processes where safety is improved through an
exogenous process (such as research), the cost function might be:
(8) C(x,a) = g(a) + h(x)
and here the discriminant is positive. One significant empirical im-
plication of the discriminant is that the supply curve of accidents
will be upward sloping if H is negative and downward sloping if H is
positive. In other words, if a competitive firm with a production
process where H is negative experiences an increase in the given full
-6-
a t
Figure One
(H < 0)
Figure Two
(H > 0)
AiX
Figure Three
(H = 0)
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price, it will supply more units of less safe equipment. This tesult
(and the converse when H is positive) an be easily seen in Figures One
and Two. An exogenous increase in p* shifts the X-curve rightward in
both graphs.
An additionally possible, though rather severe restriction on the
cost function should be noted. When the production process exhibits
constant returns to scale in output (with the accident rate constant),
the cost function is:
(9) C(x,a) = g(a)x
and H is zero. For this particular circumstance, the supply curve of
safety is infinitely elastic, as can be seen in Figure Three.
The above analysis presumes that consumers are precisely informed
as to product accident rates. A more general formulation of the nature
of consumer demand makes full price a function of the expected accident
rate E(a) cr:
(10) p = P + kE(a)
and the profit maximizing conditions for an individual firm become equa-
tion (4) and:
(11) -kxE = C
a a
3y inspection, competition forces firms in their production decisions
to reflect the extent to which consumers tradeoff market price and
safety in making their consumption decisions. To the extent that con-
sumers make systematically improper decisions, producer decisions will
not be optimal.
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III. Elements of Models for Safety Standards
The process for producer development of safety standards will be
modeled in this essay as follows.
Minimum Standard . The industry will be regarded as setting a single
minimum level for safety, rather than a grading system (such as the USDA
system for meat quality) . Since grading systems are extremely rare among
safety standards, this first specification is most plausible.
Performance Standard . The standard will be regarded as restricting
product performance, and not product design. Thus the industry stan-
dard will effectively set a minimum level for accident frequency in this
essay. Unfortunately, many product hazards are not amendable to preven-
tion through performance standards, as any safety standard must be en-
forceable through product tests that are inexpensive, reproduceable,
and documentable. The epidemological complexity of some hazards pre-
vents useful simulation of product performance and instead militates
restrictions on product design. For example, the currently promulgated
CPSC standard for blade contact for rotary power mowers is essentially
a design requirement for installation of a clutch-brake system. The
industry trade association has protested this requirement and instead
argued for a true performance standard based on artificial foot and
hand probes, an approach that has been rejected by the CPSC primarily
because the probes do not appear to simulate true mowing conditions.
Design standards are relatively undesirable because they can be
used to restrict both innovation and price competition. A well-known
exaple of this phenomenon occurred when the bi-metallic flu damper, the
Vent-O-Matic was essentially held off the U.S. market due to lack of
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appropriate ANSI standards (U.S. Senate, 1976). A more extreme example
occurred with regard to the bicycle standards set by the Consumer Product
Safety Commission. The initial version of these standards relied heavily
on voluntary standards written by industry which contained requirements
that bicycles be shipped preassembled—requirements which would have ef-
fectively excluded most foreign-made bicycles from the U.S. market. After
strong protests from biking organizations were registered, the proposed
standards were rescinded and reworked (Forester, 1973; Cornell, Noll, and
Weingast, 1976). A more extensive list of "horror stories" relating to
producer development of standards can be found elsewhere (U.S. Department
of Commerce, 1977).
Full Compliance . All firms will be regarded as exactly complying
with the standard as developed by industry. Again, while this require-
ment is not fully general there are numerous circumstances which sug-
gest that it adequately represents economic circumstances for safety
standards. For while industry developed standards are indeed often
voluntarily adopted or rejected by firms, in many cases, there are for-
midable pressures and even legal constraints on firms to conform with
the standard. Some examples of these pressures are that:
a) Major retailing companies will not in general market con-
sumer electrical products which fail to carry certification
by Underwriter's Laboratories.
b) Many voluntary standards are incorporated by reference into
laws or regulatory acts and thus effectively become mandatory
standards. The most famous (or infamous) examples of this
practice are local building codes and the mid-1970' s wholesale
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adoption by OSHA of voluntary workplace safety standards
(Smith, 1976; Hamilton, 1979). Actually incorporation by
reference is quite common, and one ANSI-representative has
estimated that as much as eighty percent of all ANSI-listed
standards have been made mandatory to some extent (Hamilton,
1979).
c) Offeror processes such as those set up by the Consumer Product
Safety Act or the Medical Devices Amendments provide that
mandatory standards be developed by outside parties, rather
than the regulatory agency administering the relevant act.
The proposed or "offered" standards are then subject to
modification by the agency before promulgation as a mandatory
standard. Within the legal framework of these laws, the
agency may ignore prospective offerors and develop the de-
sired standard in-house only under exceptional circumstances.
Given the financial constraints on most non-industry groups,
offeror processes tend to lead to industry self-development
of standards, which are then mandated by the appropriate
government agency (Cornell, Noll, Weingast, 1976).
Irrelevance of Due Process . Requirements of due process in stan-
dards activities will not be regarded as hampering industry achievement
of goals. At first glance, this aspect of the model would appear in-
appropriate due to the fact that a large portion of American standards
are developed outside trade associations and through standards organi-
zations under the famous "consensus process." The principal aspects
cf this process have been sketched as follows:
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a) Reasonable notice that a proposed standard is being considered
should be given to persons or interests which may be materially
affected by it.
b) Potentially affected persons or interests should have an oppor-
tunity to participate in the deliberations, discussions, and
decisions relating to the standard.
c) Careful consideration should be given to minority points of
view.
d) Standards should be approved by considerably more than a
majority of the affected interests, although unanimity is not
necessarily required.
e) Minorities should have the right of appeal to assure that
their procedural rights were protected and their views were
given full consideration.
f) Adequate records should be maintained to document that the
required decisional process was actually followed and the
views of minorities duly considered.
g) The entire process should be open to public scrutiny and
review.
In point of fact, however, while most standards development pro-
cedures incorporate aspects of the "consensus process," the political
economy of standards organizations is such that industry views dominate.
Despite occasional efforts at "balance" for standards committees, in
most of these institutions industry is financially and in membership
terms preponderant. When the vastly greater technical expertise of
corporate participants is considered, the constraints on industry and
-12-
particularly on large corporations, imposed by the consensus process
do not appear generally binding (Eemenway, 1975).
Symmetry. All consumers will be modeled as having the same risk
cost (k) . All firms will be modeled as facing the same cost function,
although this latter specification is not an essential element of the
analysis.
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IV. Standards Development By Competitive Firms
The first model of producer development of safety standards will
examine the case of (n) symmetric competitive firms. Standards develop-
ment under less competitive conditions will be considered in the next
section. An essential element of the model will be allowance for asym-
metry of information on safety levels between consumers and producers.
The analysis will trace first the implication of this asymmetry for pro-
ducer incentives to develop standards, and secondly will consider the
direction and magnitude of bias away from optimal safety levels that
would result if a quasi-cartel of otherwise competitive producers were
to set a minimum safety standard.
Eecause safety levels of products are not directly observable, con-
sumers generally cannot directly determine the associated risk of death
or injury for a particular unit when making purchase. On the basis of
past experiences and reports from other consumers, however, each consumer
may well properly assess the safety level for products of the industry
as a whole. Akerlof (1S70) offers the market for used cars as one where
this asymmetry of information between buyers and sellers holds true.
The welfare problem with this type of market is that producers have
strong incentives to undercut the quality or safety average for the
market as a whole. Such producer adulteration lowers production costs
and enables the adulterating firm to underprice competitors. As all
firms to some extent face these incentives, the resulting Cournot-like
equilibrium involves lower safety, and in some cases lower profits as
well.
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More exactly, consumer demand becomes a function of the expected
accident rate as in equation (10) , where now
(12) E(a) = Z a a,
J 2 2
where J denotes the set of firms and m, and a, denote respectively the
market share and the accident rate for the j— firm. Under conditions
of symmetry, m = 1/n and a. = a for all firms. Profits for each firm
become:
(13) ir - (p* - £ 2 a )x - C(x,a)
J J
with profit maximizing conditions:
(14) p = C
x
(15) -zkx - C z = 1/n
which are represented in Figures Four, Five, and Six. The dotted line
in each figure represents the A-curve corresponding to the socially
optimal equation (5).
Define the discriminant G as
(16) G = zxC - C
xa a
=» H + (z-l)xC
xa
where < z < 1, H is the discriminant in equation (6), and the appro-
priate derivatives are all evaluated at the Akerlof equilibrium in
equations (14) and (15). Note that if H is positive then G is neces-
sarily positive. Figure Four illustrates the Akerlof equilibrium when
the industry technology exhibits a negative discriminant G, Figure Five
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(asymmetric
A Information)
A (optimal)
Figure Four
(H < 0)
Figure Five
(H > 0)
(asymmetric
information)
A (optimal)
. (asymmetric
information)
A (optimal) Figure Six
(H = 0)
x
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the case where G is positive, and Figure Six the case when G is zero.
By inspection, regardless of the nature of the cost function, each firm
and thus the industry as a whole, produce products with higher than
optimal accident rates, where optimal rates can be identified by the
intersection of the X-curve and the dotted, socially optimal A-curve.
Several historical examples of this product adulteration can be offered.
In the early part of this century, shoe manufacturers used progressively
inferior leather (incorporating into the leather water soluble substances
such as glucose or Epsom salt) for soles (Alsberg, 1931). During a
later period, producers of mayonnaise began to laden their product with
gum arable, so much so that the proportion of gum arable rose to 50 per-
cent of mayonnaise content. Further addition of gum arable would have
led to probable separation of the product Into its components (Chamberlin,
1953). 2
The effects of consumer misperception on other market variables
are not so unambiguous. When G is negative (as in Figure Four) the
equilibrium output is increased due to consumer misperception and due
to the nature of demand the full price must necessarily fall. In con-
trast, when G is positive (as in Figure Five) the equilibrium output
is lower with misperception, thus the full price is increased. Note
that in the former case, interestingly enough, consumers are made better
off by their own misperception.
To illustrate the impact en industry profits, let the (z) variable
in equation (15) vary continuously in the open interval between zero
2
3oth these examples are cited in Hemingway, 1975.
-17-
and unity, where a decline in (z) indicates greater misperception. Then
the effects of misperception on the profits of an individual firm are:
where the first order conditions of the Akerlof equilibrium are used to
simplify the derivative. The second term is clearly positive, while as
discussed above the first term is of ambiguous sign. When the discrim-
inant G is nonpositive, then greater misperception (z declines) explicitly
implies lower profits. Otherwise, the effect on profits is unclear.
By way of summary, comparative statics based on the three exemplary
cost functions in equations (7), (8), and (9) are given in Table One.
Examination of the table suggests that there are indeed circumstances
under which mutual producer adulteration of product leads to lower in-
dustry profits, and hence to economic motivation for industry self-
development of standards, though these circumstances are by no means
3inevitable. Actually, it is striking that many (possibly most) com-
plex consumer products introduced during this century were subjected
to limited producer adulteration which eventually led to some form of
standardization or certification. Particular examples include tractors
(Kudrle, 1975), room air conditioners (Hunt, 1975), and more recently
solar heating equipment (Business Week, 1979), and home insulation.
3
Clearly, there are additional factors such as imperfect liability
requirements or the threat of government regulation which may propel
producers to develop standards.
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Table One
Comparison of Market Equilibria Under Perfect
Competition and Asymmetric Information
Cost Function
in Equation
3
9
Discriminant
H * C
negative negative
positive
positive positive
zero positive
a)
b)
Change in Listed Variable
When (z) Decreases
a x p* ff
increase increase decrease decrease
increase decrease increase decrease
increase decrease increase increase
increase decrease increase no change
a) For this result to hold, the 6 term in equation (7) must
satisfy: z5 > 1.
b) For this result to hold, the 6 term in equation (7) must
satisfy: z<5 < 1.
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Under those economic conditions where producers elect to develop
safety standards, a natural issue arises as to how high or low the
ninimum standard will be set. When producers of a competitive industry
congregate to set a binding minimum safety standard, but are unable to
effectively collude on other restrictions of product attributes, there
are two important limits on industry profit maximization. First, there
exists an asymmetry in the direction which safety may be changed : mini-
mum standards only set a lower bound for the safety level and in other-
wise competitive markets do not enable forced diminution of safety below
levels which competitive firms would set. Secondly, market pressures
on output in the absence of collusion must force price to equal marginal
cost. There are thus two constraints on producer behavior in the stan-
dards development process:
(18) p - C =0
(19) -zkx - C > where < z < 1
a —
where (19) simply requires that it is never profitable for a competitive
firm to raise safety (lower the accident rate) over prevailing market
levels. Should this latter constraint be violated, competitive firms
would "cheat" against the standard, raising safety until (19) held as
an exact equality.
The market equilibrium with binding minimum safety standards de-
veloped to maximize firm profits (or the standards equilibrium, for short)
is derived as a solution to the following constrained optimization prob-
lem:
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(20) L = [p*(nx) - ka]x - C(x,a) + X[p*(x) - ka - C ] - ui(zkx + C )
where (X) and (oi) are Lagrange multipliers. The Kuhn-Tucker conditions
for the constrained optimum are:
(21) L (a,x,X,oi) =
(22) L (a,x,X,oi) =
(23) p - C =
x
(24) oi(zxk + C ) = ai > zxk + C <
a — a —
The conditions for the standards equilibrium are thus (23) , (24) , and
the following equation, obtained by solving (21) and (22) for (X)
:
(25)
-T-^T CxC - C ) + (kx + C ) + -2L- M -C ax xa a a G
XX XX
where M is the following term:
(26) -<zk + C )(k + C ) - C (& n - C )
xa xa aa dx xx
The output condition or X-curve for the standards equilibrium is, as re-
quired, identical to that for the competitive equilibrium. So the
standards equilibrium will be optima] and equal to the competitive
equilibrium only if the safety conditions (24) and (25) are equal to
(5).
These safety conditions separate potential standards equilibria
into three categories. The discriminant for each of these categories
is H of equation (6) , which appears again in the first term of equation
(25). In other words, the safety conditions for the SE fall into one
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of the following three cases as the discriminant H is respectively
negative, positive, or zero. (Note that M is positive as part of the
sufficiency conditions for a maximum.)
A. H < oj « zkx + C <
a
In this first case, the inequality in (19) is strict so that this con-
straint is not binding on producer decisions. Under these circumstances,
the standards equilibrium is characterized by equation (23) and the
following safety condition:
an .jfc (
c
«;'S >. + <:.
XX
This first case presents a downward shift of the A-curve, as by inspec-
tion both sides of (27) are negative given the sign of H and the usual
sign for (dp*/dx). Figure Seven graphically presents the argument.
When H is negative, then, the accident level is set too low resulting
in lower equilibrium output, hence a higher full price.
B. H > either u - and zkx + C <
a
or u > and zkx + C =0
a
In the second case, the equilibrium accident rate is set too high, to
the extent that producer adulteration exists. As suggested by earlier
analysis, this adulteration is profitable under certain cost conditions.
When H is positive then, firms either leave the accident rate at the
high level set due to adulteration or lower this level towards, though
not to, the optimal value. In the former circumstance, (19) holds as
an exact equality as the safety condition. In the latter circumstance,
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equation (27) provides the safety condition as (oj) is zero. Both cir-
cumstances indicate an upward shift in the A-curve, as illustrated in
Figure Five for the Akerlof equilibrium. When the standards equilibrium
is characterized by equation (27) with H positive, the A-curve lies be-
tween the two curves shown in Figure Five, or above the optimal A-curve
and below the curve representing equation (15)
.
C. H = u = zkx + C <
a
In this final case, inspection of equation (25) using the above listed
information demonstrates that (25) reduces to equation (5). Thus only
in this last case is the standards equilibrium optimal.
While the three cases discussed above seem at first to suggest no
expected direction of bias in safety levels when competitive producers
self-develop safety standards, this agnostic conclusion would seem
inappropriate. It is important to recognize that the class of cost
functions discussed in case B above do not seem plausible for products
that are candidates for standardization. Minimum standards, especially
minimum performance standards, by their very nature require, alterations
of the product itself and not of the manufacturing process. Cost func-
tions such as equation (8) where safety is improved through a separate,
research-like process and where H is positive do not seem appropriate
in this context. This argument suggests that the basic tendency of the
discriminant H is to be negative or at least nonpositive in relevant
industries. As argued above, a nonpositive sign for H implies that
the bias for safety levels of products covered by producer developed
safety standards is towards too much rather than too little safety.
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V. Standards Development by Collusive Firms
It is important to consider the implications of the previous sec-
tion in the context of a less competitive market structure. For this
second model the Akerlof-type specifications for consumer expectations
of accident rates add complication without insight. Thus for this sec-
tion of the essay, consumers will be regarded as fully informed about
the safety attributes of products they purchase. Generalization of the
analysis to condition of asymmetric information is straightforward.
The industry structure will now consist of a cartel of (n) sym-
metric firms along with a competitive fring composed of (m) symmetric
firms. Basic variables for the cartel and fringe are given in Table
Two.
As in traditional models of dominant firms, the cartel will set
full price for the entire industry. While this full price will not
necessarily be identical for all firms, it does not follow that the
market or exchange price will be uniformly the same for all firms.
The cartel may well produce a safer product which sells at a higher
price as compared to output of the competitive fringe. Thus equivalent
full prices for all firms does not preclude differing proportion of
market price and risk cost between cartel and fringe.
Table Two
3asic Variables for Second Model
Variable Cartel Fringe
number of firms n m
firm output X z
accident rate a b
market price P q
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The chosen full price will maximize profits for the cartel subject
tc the supply function of output for the competitive firm. The basic
optimization problem is thus:
(28) max px - C(x,a)
a,x,z
subject to D(xn + zm) p* < p + ka
D(xn + zm) = p* = q + kb
q = C (z,b)
or by substitution to eliminate market prices:
(29) max [D(xn + zm) - ka]x - C(x,a)
a,x,z
subject to D(xn + xm) - kb C
z
First order conditions for the dominant cartel after elimination of the
Lagrange multipliers are:
(30) p + nxD'U +
c
"HVp, ] - C
x
=
zz
(31) -kx - C =0
Note that the term in brackets in equation (30) is strictly less than
unity and weakly greater than zero. Further note that when costs are
linear in output (C = 0) that the bracketed term equals zero and thus
zz
the "cartel" optimum reduces to the competitive equilibrium discussed
earlier. Under these circumstances, the supply curve of the competitive
fringe is infinitely elastic.
First order conditions for the competitive fringe, given the full
price set by the dominant cartel are:
-26-
(32) D(xn + zm) - kb - C =0
z
(33) -kz - (^ =
It should be noted that the safety condition, or A-curve, is identical
for both sets of firms and precisely the socially optimal condition for
the accident rate (given the output levels)
.
The basic market equilibrium before standards development is il-
lustrated in Figures Eight and Nine. Figure Eight applies when the
familiar discriminant H in equation (6) is negative—Figure Nine when
H is positive. The dotted X-curve represents the optimal values asso-
ciated with equation (4) of the competitive equilibrium. Equations (5)
,
(31) , and (33) are all represented as the A-curve. For each member of
the dominant cartel, the profit-maximizing X-curve or equation (31) lies
to the left of the optimal X-curve. As would be expected, each firm in
the cartel offers on the market a smaller than optimal output level.
This restriction in output forces an increase in the prevailing full
price, which as argued in the second section causes a rightward shift
of the profit-maximizing X-curve for competitive firms. At the equil-
ibrium established by equations (30) through (33) each firm in the com-
petitive fringe will produce an output level that is larger than optimal,
The greater output of the fringe however will not fully compensate for
the reduction of output by the cartel.
When H is positive, the cartel will offer a product version which
is less safe but also cheaper in terms of market price than the product
version offered by the competitive fringe (see Figure Nine). Under
these circumstances, there is clearly no incentive for the cartel to
-27-
Figure Seven
(H < 0)
X
A (optimal)
A (standards
equilibrium)
Figure Eight (H < 0) Figure Nine (H > 0)
XXX
(cartel) (optimal) (fringe)
,
x
X X
a I (cartel) (optimal) (fringe)
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develop and seek to enforce a ceiling on the accident rate. Such a
minimum safety standard would, for small changes in the accident rate,
force alteration only of the product version produced by the cartel.
Since the competitive fringe produces a safer version anyway, these
firms would not be directly affected by small changes in allowed maxi-
mum accident rates. Any efforts by the cartel to lower the maximum
accident rate under the circumstances of this second model would only
lower profits and therefore would not be attempted.
When H is negative however, the market situation is very different.
As Figure Eight confirms, the cartel now offers the safer, more expen-
sive product version while it is the competitive fringe that produces
the version with higher expected accident rate. Clearly there is now
indeed an incentive for the cartel to forcibly lower the maximum acci-
dent rate prevailing in the market. A binding minimum safety standard
could reduce the (b) variable for the competitive finge, and as inspec-
tion of both Figure Eight and equation (32) indicates, thereby reduce
the output of each competitive firm. The reduction of competitive out-
put enables an increase in the common full price, hence an increase in
the market price of cartel output, hence an increase in cartel profits.
The ability of the cartel to reduce competitive output through
safety standards causes the profit-maximizing A-curve to diverge from
the optimal A-curve. Mathematically, the optimization problem for the
cartel becomes:
(34) max [D(xn + zm) - ka]x - C(x,a)
a.x.z
subject to D(xn + zm) - ka = C
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The accident rate for the competitive fringe (b) is now forced to equal
that of the cartel (a). First order conditions for each firm of the
cartel after elimination of the Lagrange multiplier are equation (30)
and the following condition:
(35) kx + C (x,a) =• -=221 [xC (z,a) - C (x,a)]
a L za a
zz
It should be noted that since H is negative the following inequalities
hold (given the derivative restrictions on the cost function and the
fact that x < z)
:
(36) xC (z,a) - C (x,a) < xC (x,a) - C (x,a) = H <
Both sides of equation (35) are thus negative which indicates that the
profit-maximizing A-curve for the cartel lies below the optimal A-curve.
The market equilibrium after cartel determination of a minimum
safety standard is shown graphically in Figure Ten. Note that both out-
put and accident rate for firms in both the cartel and the competitive
fringe are lower after imposition of the standard than the respective
values would be without industry developed restrictions on product
safety. Further note that the accident rate as set is too low relative
to the optimal value.
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Figure Ten (H < 0)
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VI. The CPSC Architectural Glazing Standard
In January of 1976 the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC)
announced a mandatory standard for architectural glass (used in sliding
glass doors, storm doors, shower doors, etc.). The standard effectively
requires that all such glass be safety glazed, though technically the
regulation consists of performance (impact) requirements. These require-
ments are quite expensive, costing American consumers an estimated 45 to
60 million dollars a year to cover glazing costs (CPSC estimates) . None-
theless, this standard has been the least controversial of all those
issued thus far by the CPSC, and is generally regarded as one of the
few CPSC "success stories." The standard is expected to reduce injuries
associated with breakage of architectural glass.
The standard was developed under the CPSC offeror process, by the
"Consumer Safety Glazing Committee" (CSGC) . Examination of the nature
of the offeror provides a basis for insight into the nature of the
standard. The CSGC was formed in 1969 by industry to lobby, at both
state and federal levels, for more stringent standards towards archi-
tectural glass. Membership of the CSGC is listed in Table Three and
reads like a cartel roster for the architectural glass industry. Meet-
ings of the CSGC from 1969 on took place at PPG Industries (Pittsburgh
Plate Glass) facilities; the initial chairman's background included
long service at PPG Industries in marketing and research; financing for
CSGC activities was entirely provided by industry; etc. From 1969 to
1972, the CSGC was successful in convincing 32 state legislators (cover-
ing some 86 percent of the relevant market) to adopt some version of a
"model" standard—truly an impressive achievement. The CSGC effort was
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Table Three
National Glass Dealers Association, (NGDA)
PPG Industries, Inc.
Architectural Aluminum Manufacuters Association, (AAMA)
Glass Tempering Association, (GTA)
National Safety Council - Home Conference
National Woodwork Manufacturers Association, Inc., (NWMA)
ASG Industries, Inc.
Libbey-Cvens-Ford Company
Rohm and Haas Company
C-E Glass Company
Globe Amerada Glass Company
Mobay Chemical Company
National Sash and Door Jobbers Association, (NSDJA)
Fourco Glass Company
Rowland Products, Inc.
Safety Glazing Certification Council
Sealed Insulating Glass Manufacturers Association, (SIGMA)
General Electric Company, Plastics Department
U. S. Plywood - Champion Papers
Solar Control Products Corporation
J. W. Carroll and Sons
B. F. Goodrich Chemical Company
Doorlite Producers Association, (DPA)
International Brotherhood of Painters and Allied Trades, AFL-CIO
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capped by CPSC adoption in 1976 of the industry sponsored standard, which
preempted the essentially similar state standards and established for the
first time a national building standard.
Unfortunately, while the CSGC effort was presumably to industry bene-
fit, the effects on consumers are neither clear nor encouraging. The
Council on Wage and Price Stability (COOTS) in 1976 issued a critique of
the CPSC-CSGC standard arguing that safety benefits of the glazing re-
quirements (when properly discounted) were at best only 5 million dollars
per year—in other words that costs were ten times benefits for the
standard. CPSC response to the COWPS statement failed to dispute the
five million dollar calculation directly, but rather argued that re-
duced breakage of glass (thus reduced costs) actually accounted for the
largest portion of total benefits. The CPSC arguments are not docu-
mented and further would seem to establish, if anything, that the archi-
tectural glazing standard is predominantly a standard for product qual-
ity and not for product safety. When it is recognized that the CPSC
and COWPS estimates apply only to the 14 percent of the market not al-
ready affected by CSCG state-level activities, and that the total
national effects would be seven times these estimates, the desirability
of such glazing standards becomes distinctly questionable.
The above arguments suggest that the CSGC and its associated stan-
dards represent an interesting phenomena: that of an industry which
succeeds in deliberately and sharply raising safety standards for its
products, even to levels above that which would be cost-beneficial for
consumers. The models of this essay are offered as basis for analysis
of this behavior.
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VII. Conclusion
The general conclusion co be drawn from the analysis of this study
is that while there is in theory no systematic bias in product safety
when industry self-develops binding minimum safety standards, the most
likely direction of bias is for safety levels to be set too high. This
analytical result sharply differs from the apparently common though
naive view that industry maximizes its profits by seeking inadequate
safety for consumer goods. While this conclusion applies directly to
industry developed standards, the analysis here has potential implica-
tions for producer derivation of standards as well. One does not have
to regard so-called "capture" theories of regulation as completely
valid to accept the notion that producer pressures and interests
strongly affect the nature of regulatory outcomes. Understanding of
the nature of producer interests in consumer standards therefore sheds
light on regulatory development of such standards as well. Indeed, the
basic arguments of this essay suggest an outline of how a "captured"
safety agency might administer its mandate.
The prevalent notion that industry seeks to underproduce safety
seems based on the documented abuses of the voluntary standards system
in the 1960s (National Commission on Product Safety, 1970) . Yet review
of these incidents suggests that the deficiencies of these standards
actually arose due to the substantial possibility of noncompliance, par-
ticularly by smaller firms. The nonbinding nature of these early safety
standards enabled noncomplying firms to sell cheaper though less safe
products in competition with complying firms and thus substantially con-
strained standard development by those firms which intended to comply.
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The spread of product liability suits and the emergence of safety regu-
lation for almost all consumer products bring an increased likelihood
of industrial compliance to contemporary standards. Critics of industry
developed standards thus confuse the quite distinct incentives of firms
setting voluntary floors for accident rates which will be ignored by
significant industry segments and the incentives of firms (such as
those participating in the CPSC offeror process) setting mandatory
minimum safety requirements.
On the basis of this argument, most of the 1960s abuses could be
eliminated by insuring mandation of standards developed by industry.
Yet this tactic would only exacerbate the danger that standards will
be used for anticompetitive purposes. While this danger is quite real,
it must however be recognized that virtually any response to market
failure as regards consumer product safety involves the creation of
market power. Alternatives to industry standards, such as market
signaling (brand names) or bureaucratic determination of product re-
quirements hardly are free of the anticompetitive implications, or
other drawbacks. In the end, the appropriate role for industry stan-
dards remains to be determined on the basis of detailed understanding
of the relative strength and weaknesses of policy options for product
safety.
Appendix
This Appendix presents basic comparative statics analyses as basis
for the verbal arguments of the text.
I. Competitive Equilibrium
First order conditions are given as equations (4) and (5) of the
text. The second order condition is that:
(Al) CC - (k + C )' >
xx aa xa
or equivalently by rearrangement:
CA2) k + C
xa
k + C
xa
aa
Total differentiation of equations (4) and (5) gives the slope of each
equation as:
-C
(A3) 4§ xxdx k + C for equation (4)
xa
da k + Cxa(AA) dx
3
~^C for e(luation (5)
aa
Ubte that due to equation (5)
,
(A5) x(k + C ) =» xC - C - H
xa xa a
where H is the discriminant in (6) . Inspection of these results proves
Figures One through Three to be correct representations of the competi-
tive equilibrium.
II. Akerlof Equilibrium
The market equilibrium with, asymmetric information is characterized
by
CA6) p* - D(xn) =»
(A7) p* - ka - C -
CA8) -zkx - C » 0<z<l
a
Basic comparative statics analysis yields;
(A9)
-fi-jro*' - c=> <0
CA10) || „ * (k + Cxa)
W« l?- 3V1 * + <W
E = C C -Czk + C ) (k + C ) - nD'C >
xx aa v xa' v xa' aa
Second order conditions for (A7) and (AS) to maximize profits of each
firm insure that E is positive. The following equation provides sign
for (A10) and (All) (using (A8)):
(A12) zx(k + C ) = zxC - C = G
xa xa a
where G is the discriminant in equation (16)
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